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The International Price Index's Impact on Revenue
in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Alexander C. Davis*
INTRODUCTION

The costs of pharmaceuticals have been steadily increasing in many
countries, including those in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), a cohort of nations with similarly developed
economies as the United States. 1 Since 1998, OECD countries have
collectively increased their spending on pharmaceuticals by an average of
thirty-two percent, after adjusting for inflation. 2 In 2013, pharmaceutical
spending across OECD countries reached approximately $800 billion, which
accounted for nearly twenty percent of total health spending on average.3
This trend is even more pronounced in the United States, where retail
prescription drug spending has increased from $90 per person in 1960 to
$1,025 per person in 2017.4 While a significant portion of this increase in
spending represents the cost of buying new and innovative products, part of
the increase is the result of the incentives on pharmaceutical companies and
a balancing act in which individual countries engage.5

* Alex Davis has long been enthralled by public policy. He studied philosophy and
economics at Georgia State University and recently graduated from Emory University
School of Law where he focused on regulatory issues and corporate transactions. He intends
to devote his career to assisting policy makers in crafting regulations that incentivize
businesses and protect public interests.
1Neeraj Sood et al., The Effect of Regulation on PharmaceuticalRevenues: Experience in
Nineteen Countries, HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVE (2008), www.healthaffairs.org/doi/
pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.28.1.w125; Our Global Reach, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/
members-and-partners/ (last visited on Dec. 31, 2020).
2 Sood et al., supra note 1, at w125.
3 Ed Silverman, SoaringPrescriptionDrug PricesTake Big Bite Out of NationalBudgets,
STAT NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/04/soaring-prescriptiondrug-prices-take-big-bite-out-of-national-budgets/.
4 Rabah Kamal et al., What are the Recent and ForecastedTrends in PrescriptionDrug
Spending?, HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Apr. 14, 2020), www.healthsystemtracker.org/chartcollection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/#item-nominal-and-inflationadjusted-increase-in-rx-spending_2017.
s Toon van der Gronde et al., Addressing the Challengeof High-PricedPrescriptionDrugs
in the Era of PrecisionMedicine, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 22-23 (2017).

101

Published by LAW eCommons,

1

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences, Vol. 30 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3

102

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 30

Pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to differentiate prices on a
country-to-country basis in order to achieve the highest possible profits in
each country. 6 This leaves governments with conflicting internal incentives.
On the one hand, governments have good reason to expedite their price
negotiations by accepting pharmaceutical companies' sticker prices to avoid
delaying the introduction of innovative new drugs; however, they also want
to reduce healthcare spending by negotiating prices that consumers can
afford to pay.7 The idea is that when governments agree to pay premium
prices, drug companies are incentivized to develop and launch new drugs
faster, but consumers are left with higher costs as a result.8 Unlike almost
every other OECD country, the U.S. government does not control
reimbursement prices for pharmaceuticals and drug companies are therefore
free to set their own prices based on market calculations aimed at maximizing
profits. 9 As a result, U.S. prescription drug prices are among the highest in
the world, 10 which results in clinical as well as economic consequences for
U.S. patients who pay an increasing share of drug expenses in the form of
co-payments."
While patients face these high costs, the pharmaceutical industry enjoys
higher profit margins than many other industries." For example, in 2002, the
median profit margin of the top ten drug companies in the United States was
seventeen percent, compared to a margin of 3.1% for all the other industries
on the Fortune 500 list.13 Even more striking, those ten companies generated
more in profits that year than the remainder of the Fortune 500 list
combined. 14 Some researchers contend that these abnormally high profit
margins justify regulatory interventions that improve access and affordability
by reducing the costs of pharmaceuticals. 15 On the other hand, some analysts
point to research that suggests that the high cost and low output nature of
drug development causes investments in new pharmaceuticals to be more of

6 Id
? Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.

10 So-Yeon Kang et al., Using External Reference Pricingin Medicare PartD to Reduce
Drug PriceDifferentials with Other Countries, 38 HEALTH AFF. 804, 804-11 (2019).
" Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of PrescriptionDrugs in the UnitedStates:
Originsand Prospectsfor Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 864 (2016).
12 Marcia Angell, Excess in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 171 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1451,
1451-53 (2004).
13 Id.
14
Id.
15 Sood et al., supranote 1, at wl31.
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a gamble than other investments. 16 These analysts argue that such high
profits are necessary to incentivize drug companies to engage in the high risk
process of pharmaceutical research and development ("R&D") which
facilitates the creation of new medications. 7
This paper seeks to add to the debate regarding regulatory intervention in
the pharmaceutical industry by focusing on a recently proposed policy called
the International Price Index ("IPI"). Part I will explain the structure of the
IPI, the issues it seeks to address, and criticisms from those who claim that it
will have devastating effects on revenue in the pharmaceutical industry. Part
II analyzes these criticisms through an economic analysis of market power in
the pharmaceutical industry and the capacity of consumers to negotiate. Part
III compares the IPI to another regulatory intervention with a similar policy
mechanism. Part IV predicts the effect that the IPI will have on prices and
revenue based on an analysis of the elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals.
Part V then offers a brief conclusion.
I.
A.

THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE INDEX

Background of Medicare Part B and Structure of the IPI

The IPI was proposed by U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary, Alex
Azar, in 2018 as a way to reduce the costs of Medicare Part B drugs. 18
Medicare Part B covers physician-administered therapies such as biologics,
injectables, IVIG, immunoglobulins, and other products. 19 Medicare Part B
plays an important role in the market for cancer, ophthalmic, and
rheumatology therapies because manufacturers' pricing strategies are
influenced by Medicare Part B's reimbursement. 20 In other words, the Part B
program affects pricing patterns in private markets. 21 The drugs covered
16 WAYNE WINEGARDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING 6
(Pac. Res. Inst.,

June 2014), https://www.pacificresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Phama
PricingF.pdf (explaining that the cost of capital for investments into research and
development for new pharmaceuticals must compensate investors for the risks and cost
associated with bringing new pharmaceuticals to market).
17 Sood et al., supranote 1, at w126.
18 Susan Peschin & Duane Schulthess, InternationalPricingIndex Accomplishes Nothing it
Sets Out to Do,' STAT NEWS (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/10/21/
international-pricing-index-research-development/.
19 Adam J. Fein, Follow the Vial: The Buy-and-Bill System for Distributionand
Reimbursement of Provider-AdministeredOutpatientDrugs, DRUG CHANNELS (Oct. 14,
2016), https://www.drugchannels.net/2016/10/follow-vial-buy-and-bill-system-for.html.
20 Cole Werble, Health Policy Brief Medicare PartB, HEALTH AFF., 1, 1 (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000171/full/healthpolicy
brief_171.pdf.
21 Id.
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under Medicare Part B are often some of the most innovative and expensive,
and thus expenditures on Part B drugs have increased faster than other
Medicare expenditures over the last twenty years.22 As a result, Medicare
Part B is both a controversial, as well as a potentially fruitful, area for policy
reform.
As calculated under the IPI model, Medicare currently pays 180% of the
average international price for the drugs covered under the Part B program. 23
This disparity has led industry and U.S. government officials to argue that,
because of foreign governments' regulations on drug prices, they are not
paying for their fair share of R&D costs and thus unfairly benefit from the
innovation for which the United States pays. 24 While such claims may not be
entirely accurate,25 it is clear that these arguments were a motivating force
behind the IPI. 26 The IPI's central purpose, then, is to pressure other countries
to be more flexible in their current price regulations of pharmaceuticals.27
The IPI would create this pressure on other countries to increase prices by
setting a price ceiling on Medicare's reimbursement for various drugs. 28
Currently, Medicare Part B reimbursement is a "buy-and-bill" process.29
Under this process, a doctor or other provider purchases the drugs they
require using their own source of funds. 30 Then, after administering the drugs

22

Id.

23 Duane Schulthess et al., Tying MedicarePart B Drug Pricesto InternationalReference
Pricing Will Devastate R&D, 53 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 746, 746-748
(2019).
24 Salomeh Keyhani et al., US PharmaceuticalInnovation in an InternationalContext, 100
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1075, 1075-81 (2010).
25 Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, ForeignFree Riders and the High Priceof US
Medicines, 331 BMJ PUB. GROUP 958, 958-60 (2005) (A "free rider" is a term economists
use in the context of an accounting method that assigns the fixed costs of a product to
different groups based on the prices that each group pays. To illustrate, "if Group A (call it
Europe) pays $1 per pill and Group B (call it the U.S.) pays $2 a pill and each buys a million
pills, then this accounting method would assign half as much of the fixed cost to Group A as
to Group B." The term can be misleading, though depending on various circumstances. For

example, "[i]f, however, the fixed costs are only $300,000 (a tenth of the total revenue) for
the two million pills, the fixed costs could be allocated by volume rather than by price
($150,000 for each group) and [one could] conclude that Group A more than pays the fixed

costs and Group B pays much more than it has to.").
26 Keyhani, supra note 24, at 1.
What You Need to Know about PresidentTrump Cutting Down on ForeignFreeloading,
DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2018/10/25/ipi-policy-brief.html.
28 Pricing Index Model for Medicare Part B Drugs, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,546, 54,556 (Oct. 30,
2018) [hereinafter Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg.].
29
Fein, supra note 19.
30
27

Id.
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to a patient, the provider files a reimbursement claim to Medicare. 3
Medicare pays the provider the portion of the cost for which it is responsible
and the provider is responsible for collecting the patient's share of the drug
reimbursement. 32Under the IPI model, the amount of reimbursement that
Medicare could provide for Part B drugs would be limited based on the
average prices in the Indexed Countries, 33 which include Austria, Belgium,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, 34 CMS would determine the average international price for
each drug included in the model based on a standard equivalent units of drugs
in the Indexed Countries.35 The ceiling for the reimbursement of each unit of
the particular drugs would be set by multiplying the average international
price by 126%.36
The IPI is proposed to be implemented over a five-year period, during
which its ramifications will be examined.37 CMS stated that it would examine
whether the model affects the quality of care that U.S. patients receive, the
availability of drugs, and the IPI's overall costs. 38 Reimbursement prices
during the rollout of the model would be calculated based on a mixture of
average sales prices ("ASP") in the United States and the indexed price,
adjusted to not exceed a thirty percent decrease from current prices, using the
following compositions:
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

eighty percent of ASP + twenty percent of target price
sixty percent of ASP + forty percent of target price
forty percent of ASP + sixty percent of target price
twenty percent of ASP + eighty percent of target price
100% of target price. 39

For each phase-in year, CMS plans to set the limits on the prices that
Medicare can pay by using the ASP prices for the included drugs and
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,547.
34

Emily Cook et al., The International Pricing Index Model: Breaking Down CMS's

Proposed Drug Pricing Model, McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY 16 (Nov. 19, 2018)
https://www.mcdermottplus.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/1 1/IPI-Webinar-Slides.pdf
(mentioning vendors will have the responsibility to negotiate drug prices with
manufacturers).
35 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,556.
36 U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 27.
37 Cook et al., supra note 34, at 11.

Fact Sheet, ANPRM InternationalPricingIndex Modelfor Medicare Part B Drugs, CMS
(Oct. 2018), https://www.cms.gov/ newsroom/fact-sheets/anprm-international-pricing-indexmodel-medicare-part-b-drugs.
39 Cook et al, supra note 34, at 14.
38
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estimated international prices for comparable drugs. 40 CMS would then
arrive at the final values by multiplying the amount of Part B drugs purchased
by the ASP price portion, and then by the international price portion. 4 1 By
the fifth year, U.S. prices would be phased down to reflect 126% of the prices
calculated in the IPI. 42
The model would also phase in the drugs that are included. 43 Examples of
the types of drugs that the model would include are drugs for cancer and
cancer related conditions, drugs for macular degeneration, and biologicals
used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and other immune mediated conditions. 44
By the end of the phase-in period, CMS intends for the IPI to include drugs
that make up seventy-five percent of all the charges under Medicare Part B.45
The IPI model also addresses a problem within the current buy-and-bill
payment process by eliminating inefficient incentives that have led to
physicians prescribing higher priced drugs. 46 As discussed above, under the
current structure, Medicare calculates the reimbursement payment after a
physician files a claim by calculating the ASP of the administered drug plus
an "add-on" fee. 47 This "add-on" fee has resulted in incentives for physicians
to prescribe more expensive drugs because it is calculated as a percentage of
the ASP of the particular drug that the physician prescribes. 48 Research
shows that when doctors are given the option of two drugs and one is
financially beneficial to the doctor, doctors are more likely to prescribe the
drug with the financial benefit. 49 Because Medicare accepts Part B drug
prices without negotiation, 50 physicians are incentivized to prescribe the
most expensive of the already high priced drugs to take advantage of the addon fee calculation. 5 This ultimately means higher out-of-pocket drug
expenses for U.S. patients, especially seniors.s2
40 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,556.
41 Id.

42 Cook et al., supra note 34, at 14 (noting that the reimbursement price in year five would
be 100 percent of the target price); U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 27
(explaining that the final target price is 126% of the average international price).
43 See Cook et al., supra note 34, at 11.
44 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,554.
45 Id. at 54,555.
46 Id. at 54,547.
41 Werble, supra note 20, at 1.
48

Id.

49 Gronde et al., supra note 5, at 11.
" See HHS Advances PaymentModel to Lower Drug Costsfor Patients, U.S. DEP'T.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/25/hhsadvances-payment-model-to-lower-drug-costs-for-patients.html (stating Medicare accepts
sales prices for Part B drugs with no negotiation).
" Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,547.
52 U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50.
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The IPI would eliminate the incentive to prescribe higher priced drugs by
changing the calculation method for the physician add-on payments. s
Providers and hospitals would still receive an add-on payment for
administering, storing and handling drugs, but payment would not be tied to
the prices of individual drugs.54 Instead, the payment would be based on (1)
the class of drugs administered; (2) the physician's specialty; or (3) the
physician's practice.5 5 The add-on payment change is intended to be budgetneutral, as CMS stated that the purpose of the model is to remove the
incentive for physicians to prescribe higher priced drugs, not to reduce costs
through decreasing add-on payments. 56 Even so, the reality is that providers
who currently administer the most expensive products will likely see a
decrease in revenue, while providers who administer the least expensive
alternatives will likely see an increase in revenue.5
B.

Concerns about the Impact on R&D and Stifling Innovation

Some commentators fear that pursuing these goals through the IPI will
have substantial unintended consequences on pharmaceutical innovation. 58
In a widely cited study, the authors argue that implementing the IPI would
result in a decrease in pharmaceutical innovation because of the decrease in
revenue caused by the IPI. 59 In making their argument, the authors begin by
making three assertions. First, the Indexed Countries would not accede to
demands from pharmaceutical companies to accept higher prices. 60 Second,
pharmaceutical companies' total revenue is directly tied to aggregate
investments into R&D. 61 And third, the current price levels of
"3 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,547.
4

Id.

55 Id.
56 Jacqueline LaPointe, Would the IPIModel Reduce Medicare Reimbursementfor
Providers?, RECYCLE INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://revcycleintelligence.com/
news/would-the-ipi-model-reduce-medicare-reimbursement-for-providers (reporting that the
Department of Health & Hum. Services addressed concerned physicians by explaining that
its goal is not to reduce costs through reducing the add-on payment and that the purpose of
the change is to make compensation independent of pricing).
57 Joseph R. Antos & James C. Capretta, A Market-Oriented Frameworkfor Reforming
Medicare PartB Drug Payment, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (July 9, 2019), https://www.health
affairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20 190708.831097/ full/ ("In general, practices using the
highest-priced products today, with the highest ASPs, would stand to lose under the

administration's proposal, while those using lower-priced products would stand to gain.").
Duane Schulthess et al., Tying MedicarePart B Drug Pricesto InternationalReference
Pricing Will Devastate R&D, 53 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 746, 746-748
(2019).
59 Id.
60 Id.
58

61

Id.
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pharmaceuticals are necessary to maintain R&D within the industry. 62 Based
on these three assertions the study concludes that pharmaceutical R&D
budgets would decrease by millions of dollars under the IPL 63 The authors
come to this conclusion by calculating the decrease in revenue that
pharmaceutical companies would experience under an implementation of the
IPI, given the assumption that prices in the Indexed Countries would not
change.64 They then conclude that the IPI would put R&D at risk by
calculating the decrease in companies' R&D budgets under the assumption
that such budgets would be decreased by one-fifth of their total loss in
revenue. 65 While this study is widely referenced by IPI critics, its foreboding
conclusion that a reduction in drug prices necessarily comes with a loss in
innovation is unlikely to actualize.
The argument that the high prices of pharmaceuticals are justified by the
costs and labor involved in developing them is not new, as pharmaceutical
companies and their lobbyists in Washington, D.C. have long argued that
revenue from high prices today is necessary to facilitate future R&D. 66 They
argue that restricting the price of drugs will have the unintended consequence
of negatively impacting the rate at which new medications are developed. 67
Some in the pharmaceutical industry have posited that $2.6 billion is required
to develop a successful new drug. 68 However, "the rigor of this widely cited
number has been disputed" and there are several reasons to question the idea
that current prices are a result of the need for future R&D investments. 69
First, this argument incorrectly assumes that pharmaceutical companies
spur innovation. The fact is that academic institutions and financial support
from public sources, such as the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), are
the sources of much of the innovation that leads to new drug products.70 A
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

66 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 863; see also Angell, supra note 12 ("The
pharmaceutical industry has the largest lobby in Washington, DC - there are more
pharmaceutical lobbyists there than members of Congress - and it gives copiously to

political campaigns.").
67 See BOB YOUNG ET AL., Rx R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY'S R&D

"SCARE CARD" 7-8 (Public Citizen, July 2001), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/
uploads/rdmyths.pdf (explaining that drug companies stress how difficult it is to develop
new drugs because of research costs).
68 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 863.
69 Id.
See generally Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What are the Respective Roles
of the Public and Private Sectors in PharmaceuticalInnovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 339
(2011) (arguing that direct government funding is crucially important in the development of
innovative new drugs).
70
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study on public spending in pharmaceutical development found that, in the
2001 fiscal year, the NIH had a $20.3 billion dollar budget and that a
substantial portion of this was money to be spent on research for the purposes
of discovering and developing new drugs.7 1 The NIH study also found that
researchers who were funded by U.S. tax dollars produced fifty-five percent
of the published research that was responsible for the development of the top
five selling drugs in 1995. 72 Further, large pharmaceutical companies
frequently acquire startups and other small companies whose early-stage
drug development research originated in academic laboratories. 73
Second, the assertion that drug companies would cut R&D budgets by
one-fifth of their total loss in revenue is contradicted by spending trends in
the industry that show a disconnect between R&D investment and final price.
In recent years, large pharmaceutical companies have invested an average of
twenty percent of revenue in R&D,74 a percentage which is markedly lower
if one considers only innovative product development. 75 A much larger share
of revenue goes instead to marketing expenditures aimed at doctors and
pharmacists. 76 Pharmaceutical companies' marketing expenditures dwarf
their R&D efforts since the 1990s when thirty-five percent of the top ten drug
companies' expenditures was on marketing and administration, while just
eleven to fourteen percent was spent on R&D. 77
Third, the argument that drug companies price their products based on the
cost of R&D is inaccurate because sunk costs do not determine price. 78 In
other words, by the time a drug becomes available on the market, the cost of
its R&D has already been largely paid for, therefore R&D expenditures are
often considered sunk costs by the time a company is ready to sell its
product. 79 Based on economic principles, these sunk costs should not impact
how a profit-maximizing company prices its drugs. 80 Economists generally

71 YOUNG ET AL.,

supranote 67.
Id.
?3 University of Cambridge, Study: Acquisitions Threaten Access to BreakthroughDrugs,
PHARMACEUTICAL PROCESSING WORLD (Jul. 29, 2016), https://www.pharmaceutical
processingworld.com/study-acquisitions-threaten-access-to-breakthrough-drugs/.
?4 Spending of U.S. PharmaceuticalIndustryfor Research and Development as a Percentage
of Total Revenues from 1990 to 2018, STATISTA (2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
265 100/us-pharmaceutical-industry-spending-on-research-and-development-since- 1990/.
75 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 863.
76 Gronde et al., supra note 5, at 10.
77 Angell, supra note 12, at 1452.
78 Rena M. Conti & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Putting More Value into Biopharmaceutical
Value Assessments, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20171227.196339/full/.
79 Id.
72

80

Id.
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believe that firms with market power price their products based on what the
market is willing to pay - the demand - not cost of development and
production. 81 In the pharmaceuticals market, this means that companies price
their products based primarily on how much consumers value a drug and the
availability of alternative therapies. 82 Companies consider both of these
factors early on in the development process. 83 Companies will predict the
cost of bringing a drug to market and then make estimates about its value
based on the drug's ability to improve or extend people's lives, the existence
of competitors, the target market's ability to pay, and the likely insurance
coverage for the drug. 84 The demand for some drugs might enable a firm to
generate revenue well above a particular drug's R&D costs, while other drugs
may never recover their overhead costs. 85 A pharmaceutical company's long
term business depends on its average profits, which provide an ordinary
return over its costs, including the sunk costs of R&D. 86 It is likely an
oversimplification to assume that investment in R&D will stay at a fixed
portion of total revenue considering the extraordinary profits these
companies currently generate.87
Critics do identify one legitimate drawback to the IPI, which is the
possibility that some of the Indexed Countries could be deprived of essential
medicines. 88 This is based on the idea that if a country traditionally has
maintained drug prices far below the United States, pharmaceutical
companies might not seek market access in that country after IPI
implementation because of the downward pressure the low price would have
on the international average price. 89 While the possibility of a pharmaceutical
company refusing to sell to a country that rejects proposals for higher prices

81 See RUSSELL COOPER & ANDREW JOHN, ECONOMICS: THEORY THROUGH APPLICATIONS

244-48, 268 (Saylor Foundation, 2012) (explaining how price is calculated based on the
intersection of a demand curve and supply curve).
82 Jessica Wapner, How PrescriptionDrugs Get Their Prices, Explained, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
17, 2017, 8:00 AM), www.newsweek.com/2017/04/14/prescription-drug-pricing569444.html.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. (explaining the various costs of developing a drug and stating that companies
analyze how much they could charge for a drug to determine whether it is capable of
recuperating these costs).
87

MARC-ANDRE GAGNON & SIDNEY WOLFE, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL 13 (Carleton

Univ., Sch. Pol'y & Admin., 2015), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2269a.pdf.
88 Schulthess et al., supra note 58, at 750.
89 Id.
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is a concern, it also illustrates the pressure that the IPI would place on
pharmaceutical companies to change their current practices. 90
Whether this pressure would result in increased drug prices in the Indexed
Countries is a central question in the debate over the IPI. If the IPI completely
fails in pressuring the Indexed Countries to adjust the prices they pay for
pharmaceuticals, as some critics claim it will, concerns over stifling future
R&D might become more legitimate. 91 Given the disconnect between total
revenue and investments into R&D discussed above, though, even a
moderately successful price increase by the IPI would likely avert the
significant consequences that its critics fear. To understand why the IPI is
likely to succeed in its goal of pressuring other countries to modify their drug
prices, it is helpful to understand the economic background in which
pharmaceutical companies operate.
II.

MARKET POWER, PRICING, AND CONSTRAINED NEGOTIATION

A.

The Market Power of PharmaceuticalCompanies

For pharmaceutical companies, "market power" refers to a company's
ability to sell its products at prices above the marginal costs of those
products. 92 In other words, in a competitive market where two companies are
competing against each other, each will have an incentive to lower its prices
until the price of each unit equals the cost of producing that unit, that cost
being the marginal cost. 93 A company with market power has the ability to
charge more than marginal cost and may earn additional revenue by doing
so.94 The primary reason pharmaceutical companies have enough market
power to command such high prices is the market exclusivity granted by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the Food & Drug Administration
("FDA"). 95 A recent study found that brand-name drugs encompass ten
percent of prescription in the United States and seventy-two percent of drug
spending. 96 Further, from 2008 and 2015, prices increased 164% for the most
90 See discussion infra Section 11(a) (explaining how the pressure the IPI would create could
result in certain drugs being inaccessible in some countries).
91 Schulthess et al., supra note 58, at 750 (noting the total decrease in revenue caused by
Medicare paying 126% of the current price as calculated under the IPI).
92 GLOSSARY OF INDUS. ORG.

ECON.

& COMPETITION LAw, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 57, (ebook).

93 See id. at 31 (stating that profit maximizing firms will produce an output such that
marginal cost equals marginal revenue).
94 Id. at 34, 57.
95 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860-61 (this "market exclusivity" means that no other
manufacturer, generic or otherwise, may legally offer the approved drug for sale).
96 Id. at 860.
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common brand-name drugs, a shocking figure in comparison to the consumer
price index, which recorded a twelve percent increase in prices. 97 In the past,
such disproportionately high prices were limited to brand-name drugs used
to treat rare conditions, but in recent years, even drugs treating common
conditions have a high price tag. 98 Examples include new cancer drugs,
which can cost more than $100,000 per course of therapy, as well as insulin,
which increased 300% in price between 2002 and 2013.99
A brand name drug's market exclusivity arises from two forms of legal
protection. 100 First, the regulatory exclusivity awarded by FDA approval
protects new small-molecule drugs from competition for a guaranteed period
of five to seven years and new biologic drugs for twelve years. 101 Second,
patent law generates market protection that is often longer in duration than
the FDA's protection. 102 Today, a new drug that is successfully patented will
receive twenty years of protection starting from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed.103 However, the filing date often occurs
years before a company can actually introduce the drug on the market
because of the amount of time necessary to complete the development
process and receive regulatory approvals. 104 Consequently, companies are
therefore allowed to apply for extensions to make up for this lost time when
the drug was not able to be sold, and may receive up to fifteen additional
years of patent protection. 105

When a brand-name drug loses its market exclusivity, generic drugs often
become available and at a price that is, on average, eighty-five percent lower
than their brand-name counterparts. 106 Interestingly, numerous studies have
found that the availability of generic drugs does not lead to a price reduction
in the branded alternative. 107 Rather, the brand-name drug retains a price
similar to what it garnered during the period of market exclusivity and loses
97 Id.
98

Id.

99 Id.

100 Id. at 861.
101

Id.
Id.
103 Michael Dunn, Timing of Patent Filing and Market Exclusivity, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG
DISCOVERY 487, 487-88 (July 2011).
102

104 Id.

105

Id.
106 Generic Drug Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:00
AM),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/ generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts.
107 Joel Lexchin, The Effect of Generic Competition on the Price of Brand-Name Drugs, 68
HEALTH PoL'Y 47, 52 (2004) (finding that entry of generic drugs into the Canadian market
did not result in a statistically significant change in brand name drug prices and noting that
several studies have found similar results regarding the entry of generic drugs in U.S.
markets).
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the majority of its share of the market. 108 The end of a brand-name drug's
market exclusivity period thus marks a steep decline in cost for consumers
and revenue for the manufacturer.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers often address this eventual decline in
revenue by engaging in "pay for delay" activities and "product life-cycle
management." 1 09 "Pay for delay" refers to the large cash transfers that brandname pharmaceutical companies pay to the manufacturers of generics to
settle litigation challenging the validity of the brand-name's drug patent.110
The fact that brand-name companies are willing to pay such large sums of
cash to quell generic manufacturers is telling of how valuable it can be to
maintain their market exclusivity. Brand-name manufacturers can also delay
a generic drug's introduction into the market through life cycle management,
which involves extending a drug's market exclusivity period through what
are often referred to as "me-too" drugs.111
"Me-too" drugs are drugs that allow companies to prolong market
exclusivity by filing for patents on specific features of a drug, including a
pill's coating, the drug's salt moiety, its formulation, or the administration
method. 12 This is often a successful strategy because the permissive
standards for "novelty or usefulness" under the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office allow for nontherapeutic aspects to be patented after the drug's initial
patent expires.113 Me-too drugs do not require the large investments in R&D
needed to develop innovative drugs, nor do they carry the same risks as
innovative drugs in the clinical trial and development processes. 1 4 Thus, metoo drugs are cheaper to develop and have become staples in the industry." 5
From 1998 through 2003, the FDA approved a total of 487 drugs. 1 6 Of these
drugs, 379 had similar therapeutic qualities as drugs already available on the
market, while only sixty-seven of them offered benefits over previous
medications."1 7 The pharmaceutical industry has attempted to justify me-too
drugs by arguing that they help lower prices by creating competition.118 The
prices for these drugs, however, are often substantially the same as the
original brand name drug, and manufacturers often promote them to
Id.
109 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860-61.
110
Id.
108

1"

Angell, supra note 12, at 1451.
Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860-61.
113 Id
114 Angell, supra note 12, at 1451.
112

115

Id.

116

I

117 Id.
118 Id. at 1452.
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consumers as improved products instead of cheaper alternatives. 119 This
raises a central question; how do pharmaceutical companies decide the price
of a drug?
B.

The Price Determinants of Pharmaceuticals

Many pharmaceutical companies that sell brand-name drugs have enough
market power for economists to consider them monopolies. 12 A monopolist
benefits from its market power by having a large amount of control over the
price of the products it sells.121 In the pharmaceutical industry, this market
power results from the fact that medications are not suitable substitutes for
each other, and there is often only one company in the market that produces
a particular medication122 In fact, as explained above,123 the U.S. government
guarantees pharmaceutical companies that it will protect them from potential
competitors that seek to sell similar products through granting patents. 12 4

One way to measure the monopoly power of pharmaceutical companies is
by using the Learner Index. 12 ' The Lerner Index is a tool that economists use
to quantify monopoly power and is calculated by subtracting the marginal
cost that a company incurs for producing a product from the price the
company charges for that product. 126 The Lerner Index is expressed as
L = (P - MC) / P, where P represents price and MC represents marginal
cost. 127 When there is a large difference between marginal cost and price, L
will be close to one, signifying a large amount of monopoly power. 128 The
Lerner index for drug companies is typically 0.72 at a minimum because the
marginal cost of producing a drug is much lower than its price. 129
A monopolist may utilize its market power to maximize profit and may
engage in price discrimination to do so.130 Price discrimination describes the

119

Id.

Gail Rattinger et al., Principlesof Economics Crucialto Pharmacy Students'
Understandingof the PrescriptionDrug Market, 72 AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDU. 1, 1-3
(2008) (discussing the principles of economics within the pharmaceutical industry).
120

121 MARK ARMSTRONG, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION

2 (Univ. C. London, 2006).

122 Rattinger, supra note 120.
123 See discussion infra Section 11(a).
124 Rattinger, supra note 120.
125 STUART

O. SCHWEITZER

& JOHN Z. LU, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY:

PERSPECTIVES, PROMISES, AND PROBLEMS 213-214 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed., 2018).
126 Id.
127 Id.

128 Id.
129 Id.

130 ARMSTRONG, supra note 121.
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situation wherein a company sells multiple products, each with equal
marginal cost, at different prices. 131
There are many forms of price discrimination, including: charging
different consumers different prices for the same good (third-degree
price discrimination); making the marginal price depend on the
number of units purchased (nonlinear pricing); making the marginal
price depend on whether other products are also purchased from the
same firm (bundling); making the price depend on whether this is
the first time a consumer has purchased from the firm (introductory
offers; customer "poaching").132
Price discrimination thus accurately describes the current state of the
pharmaceuticals market in which drug companies maximize their profits by
charging U.S. consumers more than their counterparts in other OECD
countries. A perfect price discriminator requires complete information about
both its customers and the world so that it knows what the perfect price would
be for each person in each situation; however, not many, if any, companies
are able to achieve such precise discrimination.133 Although drug companies
do not have a perfect price schedule - one that would account for a
multitude of customer categories - they are able to identify customers who
have substantial negotiating power and those who do not, as explained
below.134
Compared to competitive pricing, monopoly pricing and price
discrimination each have the effect of leaving sellers better off and buyers
worse
off. 135 The
differences
between
competitive
pricing,
nondiscriminatory monopoly pricing, and perfect price discrimination can be
seen in Figure 1.136

131

Id

132 Id

133 Hayne E. Leland & Robert A. Meyer, Monopoly Pricing Structures with Imperfect
Discrimination,7 BELL J. ECON. 449, 450 (1976).
134 See discussion infra Section 11(c) (describing the price negotiation process and
negotiation power).
135 E. Thomas Sullivan et al., Chapter 8: Secondary-Line DifferentialPricing and the
Robinson-PatmanAct, in 7 PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, at 3 (ebook,
2013).
136 Id.
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Figure 1: Pricing Comparisons137

aMR

The demand curve "D" represents total consumer demand for an entire
market. 138 The line "MC" represents marginal cost, and the line "MR"
represents marginal revenue."'9 In a competitive industry, prices would be
pressured downward towards marginal cost and "the price of each unit of
output would be determined by the point where marginal cost is equal to

demand."14° The intersection of MC and D thus represents the competitive
price, noted as "Pc," on the vertical axis. "' When price is at this level,
demand will be high."42 Some consumers, though, "would have been willing
to pay more than the competitive price, and triangle 1-3-6 represents [this]
'consumers' surplus' - the amount of wealth created by the fact that many
consumers can purchase the product for less than the value they place on
it."143

Any company that desires to achieve the highest possible profit would
want to convert as much consumer surplus into producer surplus as

possible. 144 This is where the monopolist's ability to decide on price provides

137

Id. at 4 ("Figure 1 illustrates the differences between competitive pricing,

nondiscriminatory monopolistic pricing, and perfect price discrimination").
138

Id. at 3.

139Id

140
141

Id.
Id.

142 Id.
143

I

144 Id.

at 4.
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an advantage. 145 "If the seller sells at its nondiscriminatory profitmaximizing price, Pm ... , then the seller has created for itself a producers'
surplus equal to rectangle 2-3-5-4, which represents revenues in excess of
marginal cost."14 6 As a result, consumers' surplus is "reduced to triangle 1-24," and "triangle 4-5-6 represents deadweight loss[,]" the value that neither
consumers nor producers receive. 147 This value is lost because customers are
unwilling to pay price Pm and instead chose to buy what would have been a
less appealing substitute in a competitive market.14 8 If the seller had the
ability to perfectly determine the price that each buyer was willing to accept,
the seller could eliminate the deadweight loss by making every sale at the
determined price, and the seller would effectively translate the 1-3-6 triangle
into producer surplus.149
The result under perfect price discrimination is therefore an allocation
with similar efficiency as that under perfect competition. 150 Compared to
their outcomes in the discriminatory market, however, some consumers
would be better off in the monopoly-priced market. 151 In the monopolypriced market, all consumers would pay price Pm but some of them value the
product more than that price, and thus would have paid more under perfect
price discrimination.1 52 In the international pharmaceuticals market, this
group is representative of U.S. consumers. U.S. consumers "value" lifesaving drugs higher than Pm because, as a result of government-granted
market exclusivity, there are often no comparable substitutes for those
drugs. 15' The IPI, then, is essentially a policy mechanism meant to curtail the
pharmaceutical industry's exercise of price discrimination; the IPI is meant
to drive the U.S. price closer to the monopoly price.
C. ConstrainedNegotiating Power of the United States
A buyer's capacity to effectively negotiate is the primary countervailing
force against the market power of pharmaceutical firms.15 4 There is a unique
landscape of negotiating power in the United States because, unlike most
145

See id. (describing how a single firm with substantial market power may influence the

demand,
cost, and revenues curves).
146
Id. at 5.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.

150 Id.
151
152

Id.
Id.

153 SCHWEITZER & Lu, supra note 125, at 13 (explaining that the U.S. government provides
market protections for brand name drugs which prevent access to substitutes).
154 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 862.
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other OECD countries, the United States does not regulate pharmaceutical
prices.155 In the United Kingdom ("U.K."), the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence ("NICE") performs careful appraisals of new
pharmaceutical products before they can be introduced into the U.K.
market. 156 The National Health Service, the U.K.'s publicly-funded
healthcare system, will only cover drugs that are recommended by NICE, and
since 2000, NICE has only recommended twenty percent of drugs
considered. 157 In Germany, drug manufacturers must prove that the
additional benefits of new therapies justify higher prices when negotiating
with the government, and it is unlikely for a newly approved drug that offers
little to no clinical improvement over existing treatments to receive a higher
coverage price from public insurance plans. 158 In Australia, drug companies

undergo similar scrutiny, as they must submit an application to the
Pharmaceutical Benefit Advisory Committee, and produce evidence showing
that their drug offers better clinical value than what is already on the
market. 159
In contrast, when companies seek to introduce new drugs into the U.S.
market, they have the freedom to set their own prices.160 Further, public as
well as private buyers each suffer from limited negotiating power. While
Medicare makes up twenty-nine percent of U.S. prescription drug spending,
it is not only prevented by federal law from negotiating drug pricing and
leveraging its massive purchasing power, but also required to cover a large
number of drugs, including every available product in some categories, like
oncology. 161 Congress established this restrictive framework after hearing
input from representatives in the pharmaceutical industry who argued that, if
the U.S. government was able to negotiate, revenues in the industry would
suffer. 162 Further, state Medicaid organizations must provide insurance
coverage for all drugs approved by the FDA and have no authority to exercise
discretion based on the clinical value or cost-effectiveness of a particular
drug. 163 The Veterans Health Administration, on the other hand, is permitted
to exercise discretion in selecting which drugs it will cover. 164 Research
155 Id.
156 Schweitzer & Lu, supra note 125, at 125.
157 Id.
158 Victoria D. Lauenroth & Tom Stargardt, PharmaceuticalPricing in Germany: How is
Value Determined Within the Scope ofAMNOG?, 20 VALUE HEALTH 927, 933 (2017).
159 Andrew Wilson & Joshua Cohen, PatientAccess to New CancerDrugs in the United
States and Australia, 14 VALUE HEALTH 944, 945 (2011).
160 Gronde et al., supra note 5, at 9.
161 Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 862.
162 Id.
163 Id

164 Id.
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shows that because of this discretion, the Veterans Health Administration is
able to attain lower drug costs in comparison to the Medicare drug program
and state Medicaid organizations. 165
Private buyers, although not as directly hindered by law, face unique
negotiating difficulties. Private buyers, such as insurance companies, are
often able to effectively negotiate with pharmaceutical companies by
leveraging the list of drugs included in their insurance plans. 166 Medicare,
however, often requires private buyers to include certain drugs in their
insurance policies and, because drug companies have the ability to negotiate
with each private insurance company individually, these private buyers suffer
from unequal bargaining power at the negotiating table. 167 Studies have
shown that the enrollment of 100,000 additional members came with a 2.5%
decrease in pharmaceutical prices and five percent decrease in drug profits
earned on prescriptions filled because when insurers experienced an
enrollment increase after the Medicare Part D implementation, they were
able to negotiate lower drug prices. 168 This suggests that the scattering of

buying power in the United States has resulted in a multitude of insurance
companies that are unable to effectively negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies.
III)

REGULATING AGAINST PRICE DISCRIMINATION

A.

The Robinson-PatmanAct

The IPI would not be the first instance in which the United States has
engaged in regulatory intervention against price discrimination. 169
Examining the results of these previous interventions can provide insight
when predicting the potential results of the IPI. The Robinson-Patman Act,
though it does not operate within the pharmaceuticals market, is a perfect
example of a regulatory intervention against price discrimination. The most
relevant section of the Act is section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), which makes it
unlawful:
[T]o discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such
Id
John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and HealthcarePrices, 91 WASH. L. REv. 253, 263-64
(2015).
165

166

167 Id.
168 Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Res., How Insurers'BargainingPower Affects Drug Prices
in
Medicare PartD, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. BULL. AGING & HEALTH, Dec. 2009, at 1.
169 Thomas W. Ross, Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 27 J.L. ECON.

243, 244 (1984).
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discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them. 170
This section came about as a result of a revolution in distribution during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 7 ' The rise of large chain
stores disrupted the typical supply chain from manufacturer to wholesaler to
retailer. 172 The chain stores represented a new group of buyers - one that
could bypass the wholesaler and demand lower prices for goods than the
typical small independent store. 173 Manufacturers started promoting bulk
discounts and eventually the chain stores, especially grocery stores, were able
to undercut their smaller competitors by offering lower prices to
consumers. 14

There are several parallels that one can draw between the RobinsonPatman Act and the IPI. First, the Robinson-Patman Act is an intervention
against price discrimination, promulgated for the purpose of raising prices
for a certain group of buyers.1 7 5 Its purpose, then, is similar to the purpose of
the IPI, which, as explained in Part II(b), is intended to pressure the Indexed
Countries to raise the prices they pay for pharmaceuticals. 176 The RobinsonPatman Act accomplished its purpose by forcing manufacturers to justify the
asymmetrical prices they offered and limiting the difference between prices
to the difference between marginal costs.177 Figure 2 illustrates the effect of
the Robinson-Patman Act in a situation in which a seller is selling the same
product to two different groups of buyers. 178

The Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2020).
Ross, supra note 169.
172 Id. at 244-245.
173 Id. at 245.
174 See id. (stating that the chain stores were large organizations that threatened smaller,
higher-cost independent retailers because the chain stores gained economic advantages by
integrating the wholesale and retail functions).
175 Wesley J. Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 18, 27 (1976).
176 See discussion infra Section 11(b).
177 See Liebeler, supra note 175, at 27-28 (noting that the Act contributes to higher prices by
inhibiting the competitive price setting process and encouraging behavior that tends to
stabilize prices).
178 Ross, supra note 169, at 250-52.
170
171
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Figure 2: Robinson-Patman Constraint1 7 9

Ch if

The seller's goal is to maximize profits by selecting prices (P1, P2)."'0
Independent retailers represent the first group of buyers, and chain stores
represent the second. 181 Each group of buyers experiences constant but
different marginal costs.182 When the seller sells a unit to a chain store, "C2",
the seller incurs a lower marginal cost than that incurred when selling a unit
to an independent retailer, "C1."183 This seller would have the freedom to
choose any price, or any point in space, without the Robinson-Patman Act,
and would presumably select p* to maximize profits. 184 The iso-profit
contours around p* denote the decreasing levels of profit resulting from price
moving further from p*. 185 The Robinson-Patman Act mandates that the
difference between two prices for the same product may not exceed the
difference between the cost of selling to one consumer and the cost of selling
to the other consumer; that is, P1 - P2 must be less than or equal to C1 - C2.186
The legal price vectors are characterized by the shaded area between lines

179 Id. at 251, Figure, Profit Maximizing Prices Under the Robinson-Patman Act.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182Id

at 249.
at 249.

183 Id. at 250.
184Id

185Id
186Id
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P1= P2 and P1 - P2 = C1 - C2. 187 To maximize profits while complying with
the Act, the seller will move to point A where P1 = PA1 and P2 = PA2 188
The seller thereby reduces prices for the independent retailers and raises
them for the chain stores. 189 This redistribution of prices is exactly what the
Robinson-Patman Act intended to accomplish, and it is almost exactly what
policy makers today hope to accomplish through implementing the IPI. 190 In
Figure 2, the shaded area could be formulated to represent legal price vectors
under the IPI by changing it to a single line where the price to the independent
stores equals 126% of the price to the chain stores. It is reasonable to expect
that sellers would still experience the same pressure to conform to the new

vector.191
The empirical evidence of the results of the Robinson-Patman Act confirm
the predictions of this model. The act had a negative effect on grocery store
chain profits because the prices they paid for inventory increased.1 92 This
result was found through analyzing the changes in a stock portfolio of chain
stores before and after the Robinson-Patman Act.193 From June 1935 to
December 1937, the chain store portfolio lost to the market, having a negative
abnormal return between ten and twenty percent. 194 It is clear, then, that the
Robinson-Patman Act takes from both the seller and the chains and gives to
the independent retailers; the fact that the negative abnormal returns were
only ten to twenty percent suggests that both the manufacturers and the chain
stores shouldered the burden of the act. 195 In other words, when the
manufacturer was forced to curtail its use of price discrimination, it did not
simply lower prices for the independent stores, but raised prices for the chain
stores as well. 196 This is exactly the result that the IPI is designed to

187

Id.

188 Id.

189 Id. at 250-51.
190 Liebeler, supra note 175, at 28; Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,547.
191 See generally, Thomas Ross, The Costs of Regulating Price Differences, 59 J. Bus. 143
(1986) (stating that price setting equations and derivatives show that the Robinson-Patman
Act results in a lower price to small business and a higher price to chains and is likely to be
representative of many real-world cases where firms attempt to maximize profits while
staying within constraints of the law).
192 Ross, supra note 169, at 253-59.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 258.
195 Id. at 258-59.
196 Id. at 258 ("In the first years after Robinson-Patman was passed, chains continued to lose
ground to independents. As revealed in Table 3, the share of total retail sales going to chains
of four or more stores fell from 1933 to 1935 and continued to decline through to 1939.
Leading this decline were the grocery chains, which accounted for about 30 percent of total

chain retail sales. The losses of the drug, shoe, and variety chains were much smaller.").
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achieve-making the results of the Robinson-Patman Act a pertinent parallel
to consider when predicting the effects of the IPI.
Another potential parallel between the IPI and the Robinson-Patman Act
is their unintended consequences. The Robinson-Patman Act was somewhat
controversial due in part to the incentives it created for manufacturers to
simply refuse to deal with smaller retailers or specialized outlets that did not
handle a large volume of a particular product. 197 For example, there was a
case brought against a furniture manufacturer because the manufacturer was
offering substantial discounts to bulk buyers and charging small designers
more. 198 The Robinson-Patman Act forced the manufacturer to decide
between equalizing prices or selling exclusively to bulk buyers. 199 The
manufacturer chose the latter, forcing the small designer firms to pay more
elsewhere. 200 The IPI could cause a similar result; if a pharmaceutical
company is offering lower prices to one of the Indexed Countries, the IPI
would pressure the company to choose between either raising the price in that
country or refusing to sell to that country. 201 The company would face this
pressure because the price the company offers the Indexed Country would
affect the price the United States pays. 202 If the company agrees to a low price
for a particular Indexed Country, it will also lose revenue from a
corresponding decrease in the price in the United States. If that Indexed
Country is unable or unwilling to accept a higher price, the company might
generate more revenue by simply refusing to sell to that country and
maintaining the higher U.S. price. 203 This consequence was even alluded to

by the CEO of Allergan when he said, "companies could raise prices or stop
selling entirely in those countries, or not launch new products in those
countries . . . I don't think we'd really be impacted by the IPI [pricing
model]."204

When considering the interests of the United States, though, the potential
benefits from implementing the IPI still likely outweigh the costs. If the IPI
achieves a similar redistribution of costs as the Robinson-Patman Act, the
United States is likely to see a net benefit in the form of lower drug prices.
Whereas the Robinson-Patman Act was controversial, in large part, because
197 Liebeler, supra note 175, at 32.
198 Id. at 33.
199

Id.

200 Id.
201 See discussion supra Section I(b).
202 Liebeler, supra note 175, at 32.
203

Id.

204 Ed Silverman & Mathew

Herper, Allergan CEO: We Stuck to the Spirit of our Social

Contractwith Recent Price Hikes, STAT (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/
pharmalot/2019/01/08/allergan-drug-prices-social-contract/.
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of competing ideas about what constitutes an ideal welfare function, 20 5 the
common interests that U.S. policy makers have should cause an effective
redistribution under the IPI to be more palatable. Whether such a
redistribution is effective, though, depends on the willingness of the Indexed
Countries to accept increased prices. 206 The price change caused by the
Robinson-Patman Act modeled in Figure 2 relies on the assumption that the
buyer's demand function does not change. 207 There is reason to believe,
however, that these functions actually changed significantly because the
Robinson-Patman Act applied to every firm in the market; thus, just as the
seller in the model could not continue to provide the chain stores with
discounts, the other sellers in the market were also unable to do so. 208 The
chain stores therefore sacrifice some bargaining power in transactions with
suppliers, essentially decreasing their elasticity of demand. 209 Similarly, the
IPI would apply to every pharmaceutical firm that participates in the
Medicare Part B market. Because so many pharmaceutical companies
participate in the U.S. market, European buyers may likewise experience a
shift in their demand functions.
IV)

PREDICTING PRICE CHANGES UNDER THE IPI

A.

Elasticity of Demand

Whether the demand curves of the Indexed Countries would shift is
determinative of whether the Indexed Countries would accept higher prices
for pharmaceuticals. As explained below, static demand curves would mean
that the Indexed Countries would not accept higher prices, causing greater
revenue loss for pharmaceutical companies, whereas responsive demand
curves would mean less or no loss in revenue. Therefore, any prediction
about the IPI's effect on revenue must include an analysis on the elasticity of
demand of the Indexed Countries.
Demand for a good or service is defined as inelastic if price changes do
not affect the demand for that good or service. 210 In other words, inelastic
demand means that the amount of goods demanded changes by less than one

205 Ross, supra note 169, at 251-53.
2 06

Id. at 252 (noting that that the price redistribution under the Robinson Patman Act

depended on changing demand functions).
207

Id.

208

Id.

Id.
0 Elasticity of Demand, LIR. ECON. & LIBERTY (Apr. 16, 2020, 12:00 PM),

209
21

https://www.econlib.org/library/ Topics/College/elasticityofdemand.html.
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percent even when there is a one percent change in the price of those goods.2
A perfectly inelastic demand curve appears as a vertical line which represents
that a change in price has no impact on quantity demanded. 212 There are
likely no real-life examples of goods with perfect inelasticity, but there are
some products that come close because of a lack of suitable substitutes. 213
Prescription drugs are among the most common products with inelastic
demand, along with food and tobacco.21
The inelasticity of the demand for pharmaceuticals is well-documented
and researched.2 15 Several studies found that the elasticity of demand for
prescription drugs in various European countries ranged from -0.09 to -0.64,
with the most frequent findings falling in the middle of this range. 216 An
elasticity of -0.09 means that for every percentage point that prescription
drug prices increased, the quantity of prescription drugs purchased decreased
by 0.09%.217 These values thus represent a highly inelastic demand. Further,
demand for the newest, most innovative drugs is often especially inelastic
because the alternative therapies for those products are not adequate
substitutes. 218

Countries that have high rates of insurance coverage also tend to have less
elastic demand for pharmaceutical drugs because insured patients are less
price sensitive, or less affected by the price of drugs covered by their
insurance. 219 Consumers in many of the Indexed Countries have higher rates
of insurance coverage than consumers in the United States.220 Therefore, the
consumers in many of the Indexed Countries are likely to have less elastic

211

Id.

212 RICE UNIV., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, POLAR CASES OF ELASTICITY AND CONSTANT

ELASTICITY 3, loc. 5.2 (2014) (ebook).
213 Id.
214 Mary Hall, Elasticity Vs. Inelasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 9, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ ask/answers/012915/what-difference-between-inelasticityand-elasticity-demand.asp.
21 Marin Gemmil, The Price Elasticity of Demand for Prescription Drugs: An Exploration
of Demand in Different Settings 58-61 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, London Sch.
Econ. & Pol. Sci.), https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2944/ 1/U615895.pdf.
216 Id. at 60 (several of these studies were based on relatively small sample sizes though).
217 Id. at vii. ("Price elasticity of demand - the percentage change in the quantity demanded

brought about by a one percentage change in the price of the good or service.").
218 Id. at 49.
219 Patricia Danzon & Eric Keuffel, Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology
Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 407, 407

(Nancy L. Rose ed., U. Chi. Press 2014) (noting that produces can charger higher prices on
those who are insured).
220 Eric Schneider et al., InternationalComparisonReflects Flaws and Opportunitiesfor
Better U.S. Health Care, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 16, 2020, 12:20 PM),
https://interactives.commonwealthfund.org/2017/july/mirror-mirror/.
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demand than their U.S. counterparts. Although co-payments can make
insured consumers more price sensitive, demand for prescription drugs
remains highly inelastic.2
B.

Pharmaceutical Review Agencies

The highly inelastic demand for prescription drugs is one of the reasons
that so many European countries have pharmaceutical review agencies that
act as a negotiating agent for their respective countries.222 These agencies are
meant to mitigate the inelasticity of demand for consumers who might
otherwise accept higher prices. 223 Their role in negotiating with
pharmaceutical companies will therefore cause some variation in the general
measurements of elasticity. 24 Accordingly, an accurate prediction of price
changes under the IPI must account for this and analyze the parameters of
these countries' negotiating capacities. The largest foreign markets
referenced in the IPI, such as Japan, Germany, and France, all have
governmental agencies with the specific tasks of determining the value and
cost-effectiveness of new drugs before they enter their respective markets.2
These agencies often allow for price premiums for drugs that are "more costeffective or support a small market or pediatric indication" and will calculate
"price adjustments if the proposed prices vary significantly from the average
sales price in comparable foreign markets." 226
Similar to the U.S. health care system, the German health care system
arrives at pharmaceutical prices primarily through negotiation, instead of
regulation, and is financially supported through multiple private payers.2
Danzon & Keuffel, supra note 219, at 442 (noting that copayments can mitigate the
insurance effect, but because copayments also reduce financial protection, in practice most
public insurance plans include only very modest copayments).
222 See generally Jacob Morey & Daniel Charytonowicz, InternationalPricing Index:
Outsourcing Negotiations will Continue the US Drug Cost Crisis, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 16,
2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/ 10.1377/hbl-og20190307.887201/full/
221

("These countries all have governmental agencies with the specific tasks of developing costeffectiveness analyses and calculating price adjustments if the proposed prices vary

significantly from the average sales price in comparable foreign markets.").
223 Id

224 See id. (describing how these agencies act as a mediator between the pharmaceutical
companies and consumers, and their cost-effectiveness analyses and price calculations
represent more than merely the quantity demanded by the consumers within their respective
countries).
225 Id.
226
227

Id.

James C. Robinson et al., Reference Pricing in Germany: Implications for U.S.
Pharmaceutical Purchasing, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 16, 2020, 1:10 PM),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/jan/reference-pricinggermany-implications.
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Where the German system differs is in its two-tiered pricing system; the
prices for drugs that offer benefits over currently available medications are
determined by negotiating with pharmaceutical companies, but reference
pricing is used when a drug offers little or no benefit over these other
medications. 228 This two-tiered pricing system allows German consumers to
access drugs at considerable lower prices than U.S. consumers. 229 Germany

enforces this system by limiting the amount that insurance companies can
pay for drugs with therapeutically equivalent alternatives. 230 This allows
pharmaceutical companies to set their own prices, but limits insurance
payments for new drugs based on the amount that insurance companies
provide for similar drugs unless a new drug offers a clinical benefit that its
competition does not. 23 1

Unlike many frameworks used by European countries, Germany and the
United States do not directly evaluate the relative clinical benefit of new
pharmaceuticals or negotiate prices, 23 2 but the German system has several
features which are distinct from the U.S. system. 233 In Germany, all
pharmaceuticals authorized by the European equivalent to the FDA, the
European Medicines Agency ("EMA"), may be prescribed by physicians
immediately after approval. 234 In this initial period, pharmaceutical
companies are free to set the price of the new drug as they see fit and receive
full reimbursement.23 But over the course of the initial one year period,
Germany analyzes the new drug's clinical safety and effectiveness as
compared to other available alternatives. 236 If the German government
determines the new drug has incremental benefits, it may increase the price
it pays in comparison to a specified comparator drug within the same class
of medication. 237 And conversely, if no such finding is made, the price will
fall to the lowest price bracket within the class. 238
Despite Germany's evaluation system, many new drugs gain access to the
German market, including less innovative drugs. 239 Research shows that
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231Id
232 Id.
233 Id.
234Id

235 Id.
236Id

237 Id.
238 Id.
2 39

No Evidence ofAdded Benefit for Most New Drugs, Say Researchers, BMJ (Apr. 16,
2020, 1:20 PM), https://www.bmj.com/company/newsroom/no-evidence-of-added-benefitfor-most-new-drugs-say-researchers/.
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"

over half of the drugs that Germany approves have no added benefit over
their alternatives. 240 In Germany, from 2011 to 2017, their pharmaceutical
review agency approved 216 drugs, the vast majority of which had already
received EMA approval.241 Fifty-four of the drugs were found to have a
"considerable or major added benefit."242 For thirty-five of the drugs, "the
added benefit was either minor or could not be quantified," and 125 of them
showed no added benefit compared to the alternative products that were
already available.24 3 Further, an assessment of oncology pharmaceuticals
authorized by the EMA between 2009 and 2013 showed that a majority had
been approved with zero evidence of "clinically meaningful benefit on
patient relevant outcomes (survival and quality of life)," an outcome which
did not change over time. 2
In France, the Comitd Economique des Produits de Santd ("CEPS") is the
primary economic decision maker in the realm of pharmaceuticals and it
negotiates the final reimbursement rate for all new pharmaceuticals based on
an assessment from a medical evaluation commission. 24s The technical
assessment that the commission provides includes three findings. 246 First, the
commission estimates the Medical Benefit ("SMR") by determining a drug's
reimbursement eligibility and the recommended parameters of the potential
reimbursement rate. 247 The SMR assessment includes investigations into a
variety of factors, including: (a) a drug's efficacy and safety, (b) the position
of the medicine in the therapeutic strategy and whether there are any close
alternatives available, (c) the severity of the relevant disease, (d) whether the
treatment is preventive, curative or symptomatic, and (e) the public health
impact. 248 Using those elements, the commission determines the drug's
medical benefit, the levels of which range from major, important, moderate,
weak, and insufficient to reimburse. 249 Second, it provides an Improvement
of Medical Benefit assessment ("ASMR"), which establishes a target price

240
241

Id.
Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.

245 Alexander Natz & Marie-Genevieve Campion, Pricingand Reimbursement of Innovative

Pharmaceuticalsin Franceand the New Healthcare Reform, 13 FARMECONOMIA HEALTH
ECON. & THERAPEUTIC PATHWAYS 49,50-51 (2012). "The Comitd Economique des Produits

de Santd" translates to "The Healthcare Products Pricing." Committee."
246 Annie Chicoye et al., France - Pharmaceuticals,ISPOR (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://tools.ispor.org/htaroadmaps/
France.asp.
247

Id.

248

Id.
Id.

249
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by comparing the new drug to currently available alternatives.250 Except for
cases involving drugs that use unique mechanisms to treat a condition, the
agency performs this comparison by looking at alternatives within the same
therapeutic class.251 The agency then provides one of five ASMR levels
ranging from major innovation, important improvement, significant
improvement, minor improvement, and no improvement. 25 2

CEPS then uses these findings as a basis for its negotiations with
pharmaceutical companies.2

3

The drugs recognized as major or irreplaceable,

like HIV drugs, and drugs that treat chronic and severe diseases are
reimbursable at 100% - that is, the consumer or other buyer is reimbursed
for 100% of the cost of the drug.25 4 In 2007, the average reimbursement rate
for retail pharmacist drugs was 76.77%.255 This broad insurance coverage
means that demand for pharmaceuticals in France is particularly inelastic.
Thus, even in this complex framework, spending on pharmaceuticals in
France is rapidly increasing.2 5 6

The French regulatory scheme for hospital drugs provides drug companies
more flexibility in setting prices. 257 This fact is especially relevant because
these drugs would likely include those drugs covered under Medicare Part
B. 258 In France, hospitals have authority to agree to drug prices with
pharmaceutical companies independent from the government, however, for
the more expensive drugs that will be charged to health insurance, the
company must thereafter disclose to the government the price they intend to
charge, as well as the prices they offer in other European countries. 25 9 If
CEPS does not approve the declared price, it will intervene and negotiate
with the drug company. 260 These negotiations are based on similar
considerations as the SMR and ASMR ratings. 261
In Italy, the Italian Medical Agency ("AIFA") negotiates with
pharmaceutical companies using similar parameters as Germany and France,
2s0

Id.

251

Id.

252 Id.
253

Id.

254 Id.
255 Id.

Nathalie Grandfils, Drug Price Setting and Regulation in France 2 (IRDES Working
Paper N. DT16, Sept. 2008), https://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/
WorkingPapers/DT16DrugPriceSettingRegulationFrance.pdf.
257 Chicove et al., supra note 246.
258 See Fein, supra note 19 (explaining that Medicare Part B includes physician-administered
drugs).
259 Chicove et al., supra note 246.
256

260

Id.

261

Id.
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but provides greater flexibility for highly innovative drugs.2 62 During their
negotiation with AIFA, companies may request approval for status as an
innovative drug.2 63 Italy has established separate funds to cover expenditures
for innovative drugs which are not subject to the same reimbursement
constraints of other drugs.2 64 AIFA may grant full "innovative status," which
provides access to these separate funds, or "conditional status," which means
the drug will be included in Italy's Regional Therapeutic Handbooks. 265
AIFA determines how innovative a drug is for a particular indication by
considering three evaluation criteria: unmet therapeutic need, added
therapeutic value, and quality of evidence. 266 In 2017, Italy introduced a new
algorithm to assess whether a drug should receive this status and increased
its innovative drug fund to $1.2 billion. 267 The new algorithm is expected to
provide more flexibility and room for reviewer discretion.26' The new
algorithm and increased funding will likely cause demand for innovative
pharmaceuticals to become more inelastic.
C. The IPI's Effect on Revenue
It is clear that the pharmaceutical review agencies in Indexed Countries
mitigate the inelastic demand of consumers; however, it is also clear that the
negotiating processes described above consider a wide variety of factors and
allow pharmaceutical companies opportunities to justify prices for new drugs.
Critics of the IPI are not alone in their fears that decreased revenue will lead
to a decrease in innovation as the policies of Germany, France, and Italy
demonstrate that these countries understand the high costs involved in
pharmaceutical development and that they are willing to pay more for more
innovative drugs. 269 For example, the French system is sometimes praised as
an exemplary method of controlling spending on pharmaceuticals compared

Mauro Putignano & Sonia Selletti, Pricing & Reimbursement 2019: Italy, GLOBAL LEGAL
INSIGHTS (Apr. 16, 2020, 2:20 PM), https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/
pricing-and-reimbursement-laws-and-regulations/Italy.
262

263 Id

264

Id.

265 Id.

&

266 Yulia Privolnev, What is Pharmaceutical Innovation, Anyway? Italy's New Algorithm
the Global Trend, PHARMACEUTICAL ONLINE (April 16, 2020, 2:30 PM),
https://www.pharmaceuticalonline.com/doc/what-is-pharmaceutical-innovation-anywayitaly-s-new-algorithm-the-global-trend-0001.
267 Id.

268

Id.

269 See generally discussion supra Section IV(b).
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to other countries,27' yet drug companies have been consistently successful
in negotiating prices in France. 271Further, when drug companies are pushed
to charge higher prices in these countries as a result of the IPI, they will likely
benefit from some of the reference pricing mechanisms described above.272
This is because companies will likely put pressure on multiple countries that
reference each other's prices, thus pushing the reference points higher.
The result of pharmaceutical review agencies, then, is not transforming
demand for pharmaceuticals from highly inelastic to highly elastic. Rather,
the result is a change from highly inelastic demand to a moderately inelastic
demand. Therefore, when considering the potential effects of the IPI, the
relevant inquiry is not whether prices in the Indexed Countries will change
but how much prices will change.
The fact that the IPI would cause prices in the Indexed Countries to
increase provides a basis to estimate net revenue changes. In other words, by
modeling various potential price changes in the Indexed Countries, it is
possible to more clearly understand the extent to which total revenue would
change under the IPI. The charts below provide several models of how
revenue may change by using fictional sales data from a hypothetical drug
("Hypothimta"). 273 Assume that, for each of the Indexed Countries, 0.03% of
their populations suffer from a condition and that Hypothimta is the only
treatment or has no close substitutes. Each person who is afflicted by the
condition needs a total of ten grams of Hypothimta to recover from the
disease.

270 See David Andelman, The French Solution to US Drug Prices, CNN (Apr. 16, 2020, 2:00
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/opinions/healthcare-drug-prices-compared-franceintl/index.html (explaining that France has enormous bargaining power with drug
manufacturers because the government runs the country's universal healthcare program,

which make it's by the far the largest purchaser for most drugs, and thus successfully sets
price ceilings for drug makers).
271 Grandfils, supra note 256, at 17.
272 See generally supra Section IV(b) (explaining that reference pricing ties the price of a
drug in one country to its price in other countries).
273 See World Population Clock, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2020) (explaining data on populations of each country);
Medicare FastFacts, NAT'L COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE (June 2,
2020), https://www.ncpssm.org/our-issues/medicare/medicare-fast-facts/ (explaining data on
Medicare Part B population).
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Figure 3: Pre-IPI Revenue 274
COUNTRY
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark

PRICE PER GRAM
RATE
$2,642
$2,736
$2,840
$3,030
$2,710

0.03%
0.03%
0.03%
0.03%
0.03%

POPULATION
TOTAL GRAMS BOUGHT
REVENUE
8,955,102
26,865
$70,978,138
11,539,328
34,618
$94,714,804
37,411,047
112,233 $318,742,120
10,689,209
32,068
$97,164,910
5,786,561
17,360
$47,044,741

Finland

$2,793

0.03%

5,532,156

France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan

$2,755
$2,783
$2,693
$2,400
$2,800
$2,725

0.03%
0.03%
0.03%
0.03%
0.03%
0.03%

65,129,728
83,517,045
10,473,455
4,882,495
60,550,075
126,860,301

16,596

$46,353,935

Netherlands

$2,810

0.03%

17,124,402

51,373

$144,358,709

United Kingdom
AVERAGE

$3,173
$2,778

0.03%

67,530,172

202,591

$642,819,707

US (Medicare)

$5,000

0.05%

52,100,000

260,500 $1,302,500,000

195,389 $538,297,202
250,551 $697,283,809
31,420
$84,615,043
14,647
$35,153,964
181,650 $508,620,630
380,581 $1,037,082,961

TOTAL--

$5,665,730,673

The price that each country pays per gram of Hypothimta differs between
these countries up to a margin of fifteen percent above or below the index
average, which is consistent with real world data for many of the top
Medicare Part B drugs. 275 The Medicare price per gram is 180% of the index
average, and, because the Medicare population includes a higher percentage
of sick people than the general population of the United States, the incidence
of the disease is higher in the Medicare population. 276 Figure 3 models the
revenue generated from the Indexed Countries for Hypothimta before the IPI
is implemented. Here, Hypothimta generates a total of $5,665,730,673 in
revenue.

274 Figure 3 illustrates the likely kinds of percentage changes in revenue that the IPI would
cause, the exact dollar amounts are arbitrary; any index average would result in informative
results given that the price that each Indexed Country pays are not wildly different from each
other, and the price that Medicare pays is 180% of the index average.
275 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES
FOR TOP MEDICARE PART B DRUGS BY TOTAL EXPENDITURES

atl3Table

2 (2018),

https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/259996/ComparisonUSInternationalPricesTopSpending
PartBDrugs.pdf.
&

276 MELISSA ALDRIDGE & AMY KELLEY, DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY
HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE, Appendix E: Epidemiology of

Serious Illness and High Utilization of Health Care 310, 517 (2015) (ebook).
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Figure 4: No-Price-Change Revenue2 77
COUNTRY

PRICE PER GRAM

RATE

POPULATION

TOTAL GRAMS BOUGHT

REVENUE

Austria

$2,642

0.03%

8,955,102

26,865

Belgium

$2,736

0.03%

11,539,328

34,618

$70,978,138
$94,714,804

Canada

$2,840

0.03%

37,411,047

112,233

$318,742,120

Czech Republic

$3,030

0.03%

10,689,209

32,068

$97,164,910

Denmark

$2,710

0.03%

5,786,561

17,360

$47,044,741

Finland

$2,793

0.03%

5,532,156

16,596

$46,353,935

France

$2,755

0.03%

65,129,728

195,389

$538,297,202

Germany

$2,783

0.03%

83,517,045

250,551

$697,283,809

Greece

$2,693

0.03%

10,473,455

31,420

$84,615,043

Ireland

$2,400

0.03%

4,882,495

14,647

$35,153,964

Italy

$2,800

0.03%

60,550,075

181,650

$508,620,630

Japan

$2,725

0.03%

126,860,301

Netherlands

$2,810

0.03%

17,124,402

51,373

$144,358,709

United Kingdom

$3,173

0.03%

67,530,172

202,591

$642,819,707

AVERAGE

$2,778
0.05%

52,100,000

260,500

$911,776,050
$5,275,006,72'

US (Medicare)
TOTAL

$3,500

380,581 $1,037,082,961

Figure 4 illustrates the change in revenue if prices do not change in the
Indexed Countries and the U.S. price becomes 126% of the current average.
This result is unlikely. Based on the market power that pharmaceutical
companies have, the inelastic demand for pharmaceuticals, and the results of
similar regulations against price discrimination, it is unreasonable to think
that the IPI would create results comparable to those in Figure 4. Revenue in
Figure 4 is decreased to $5,275,006,723, a decrease of almost seven percent.
However, this decrease in revenue likely overstates the percentage of revenue
that most companies would actually lose because if the revenue from sales to
countries other than the Indexed Countries was included, total revenue would
be higher, making the change a smaller percentage of total revenue.

277
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Figure 5: Price-Changes Revenue 278
COUNTRY

PRICE PER GRAM

RATE

POPULATION

TOTAL GRAMS BOUGHT

REVENUE

Austria

$2,774

0.03%

8,955,102

26,865

Belgium

$2,873

0.03%

11,539,328

34,618

$99,450,544

Canada

$2,982

0.03%

37,411,047

112,233

$334,679,226

Czech Republic

$3,182

0.03%

10,689,209

32,068

$102,023,155

Denmark

$2,846

0.03%

5,786,561

17,360

$49,396,978

Finland

$2,933

0.03%

5,532,156

16,596

$48,671,632

France

$2,893

0.03%

65,129,728

195,389

$565,212,062

Germany

$2,922

0.03%

83,517,045

250,551

$732,147,999

Greece

$2,828

0.03%

10,473,455

31,420

$88,845,795

Ireland

$2,520

0.03%

4,882,495

14,647

$36,911,662

Italy

$2,940

0.03%

60,550,075

181,650

$534,051,662

Japan

$2,861

0.03%

126,860,301

Netherlands

$2,951

0.03%

17,124,402

51,373

$151,576,644

United Kingdom

$3,332

0.03%

67,530,172

202,591

$674,960,693

AVERAGE

$2,917
260,500

$957,364,853

US (Medicare)

TOTAL

-$--5,538,757,060
$3,675

0.05%

52,100,000

$74,527,045

380,581 $1,088,937,109

Figure 5 illustrates revenue when prices in each Indexed Country increase
by five percent. The actual result of the IPI would not be so uniform; prices
in some countries would likely increase substantially while other countries
would experience moderate or small increases. The model, however, still
makes several important points. First, the five percent increase in price is a
modest increase in expenditure for each of the Indexed Countries. For
example, Italy would need to pay approximately twenty-five million dollars
more in total for Hypothimta, an increase slightly more than two percent of
its yearly funds for innovative pharmaceuticals alone. Second, a five percent
price increase in the Indexed Countries pushes the Medicare price up. This
result is an anticipated part of the IPI. 279 The goal of implementing the IPI is
not to decrease Medicare prices to 126% of current prices but to 126% of
higher future prices. 280 Medicare still benefits though, as Figure 5 indicates
that Medicare would save approximately $345 million on the total cost of
Hypothimta under the IPI. The Hypothimta manufacturer loses
$126,973,613.8 in Hypothimta revenue, representing a decrease in revenue
of approximately 2.24%.

278 Figure 5, data consistent with U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 275.
279 Pricing Index Model, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,556.
280 Cook et al., supra note 34, at 1.
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Figure 6: Excluding Small Buyers 281
COUNTRY

PRICE PER GRAM

RATE

POPULATION

TOTAL GRAMS BOUGHT

REVENUE

Austria

$2,774

0.03%

8,955,102

26,865

Belgium

$2,873

0.03%

11,539,328

34,618

$99,450,544

Canada

$2,982

0.03%

37,411,047

112,233

$334,679,226

Czech Republic

$3,182

0.03%

10,689,209

32,068

$102,023,155

Denmark

$2,846

0.03%

5,786,561

17,360

$49,396,978

Finland

$2,933

0.03%

5,532,156

16,596

$48,671,632

France

$2,893

0.03%

65,129,728

195,389

$565,212,062

Germany
Greece

$2,922
$2,828

0.03%
0.03%

83,517,045
10,473,455

250,551
31,420

$732,147,999
$88,845,795

Ireland

$2,400

0.010%

4,882,495

4,882

$11,717,988

Italy

$2,940

0.03%

60,550,075

181,650

$534,051,662

Japan

$2,861

0.03%

126,860,301

Netherlands

$2,951

0.03%

17,124,402

51,373

$151,576,644

United Kingdom
AVERAGE

$3,332
$2,908

0.03%

67,530,172

202,591

$674,960,693

0.05%

52,100,000

260,500

US (Medicare)

TOTAL

-$

$3,664

$74,527,045

380,581 $1,088,937,109

$954,551,453

5,510,749,985

Figure 6 illustrates a potential unintended consequence of the IPI. Here,
assume that Ireland refuses to accept a higher price, and that Ireland does not
want to buy as much of Hypothimta as other countries, either because it
happens to have a lower incidence of the underlying disease or because it has
access to some alternative therapy. Hypothimta's manufacturer would be
better off refusing to sell to Ireland because of the downward pressure
Ireland's price would have on the Medicare price limit. Figure 6 shows that
total revenue for Hypothimta when the manufacturer sells to Ireland is
$5,510,749,985; conversely, if the manufacturer excluded Ireland, total
revenue would be $5,511,862,724.
The above models illustrate the pressure that the IPI will put on prices in
the Indexed Countries and the resulting decreases in revenue. This
framework and analysis should assist in providing some context to claims
that the IPI will devastate R&D investments. Given that revenue decreases
in a similar way as is illustrated in Figure 6, it is unclear whether the IPI
would significantly affect R&D budgets or merely decrease profit margins.
One study, which analyzed ten of the world's largest pharmaceutical
companies' annual accounting reports from 1996 to 2005, found that the
reports disclosed net operating profits of $413 billion after tax, and a 29%
net return on shareholders' investments. 282 This is not a normal return on

281 Figure 6, data consistent with U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 275.
282 GAGNON & Wolfe, supranote 87.
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investment in any other industry.283 Further, of their net earnings, the ten
companies allocated 77%, or $317 billion, to shareholders, and 16%, or $65
billion, to future mergers and acquisitions.284
V.

CONCLUSION

Arguments claiming that the IPI will reduce the pace of innovation likely
overstate its potential impact on revenue and understate, both, the amount of
revenue generated from un-innovative pharmaceuticals, such as "me-too"
drugs, and the amount of revenue that is distributed as profits rather than
invested in R&D. Pharmaceutical companies' market power provides
substantial leverage in their negotiations with consumers who attach a high
value to innovative drugs, and thus it is reasonable to conclude that the IPI's
upwards pressure on prices in the Indexed Countries will be at least
moderately successful. In support of this conclusion, the Robinson Patman
Act illustrates that policy mechanisms that create this kind of upwards price
pressure are effective. The IPI is thus likely to be a successful mechanism in
addressing the high cost of pharmaceuticals under Medicare Part B without
causing substantial decreases in investments into R&D.

283 Id.
284 Id.
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